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guidelines for environmental offences, this article argues that the enforcement of 
environmental law is undergoing significant change. This change manifests itself in an 
increased reliance on written negotiated agreements in the form of enforcement undertakings 
by the Environment Agency and a willingness of the courts to hand down significant fines to 
certain types of polluters. These new dynamics suggest that negotiation continues to play an 
important role in the enforcement of environmental albeit in a contractualised form. The 
application of the courts by the sentencing guidelines conversely suggests that environmental 
offences are no longer trivialised by the courts. Taken together these emerging dynamics not 
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established understandings and perceptions of regulatory enforcement.  
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INTRODCUTION 
 
This article revisits and seeks to inject some nuance into deep-held and dominant 
understandings of regulatory enforcement. Utilising the enforcement of environmental law as 
a case study, the article argues that a series of recent changes to the enforcement landscape 
have significantly changed the underlying dynamics of enforcement and the ways in which the 
courts respond to environmental prosecutions. Traditionally, our understanding of the way in 
which enforcement of environmental law works in practice has been significantly shaped by a 
series of dominant assumptions. Thanks to highly influential work on the ways in which 
enforcement officers secure regulatory compliance, it has become evident that the enforcement 
of strict liability offences is highly contingent on the enforcement agents’ actions, their 
perceptions of themselves and their role, and their relationship with alleged offenders.1 A 
central theme to emerge from the seminal socio-legal studies is thus that regulatory 
enforcement is to a significant degree based on negotiation, persuasion and bargaining rather 
than formal legal responses which are generally considered a ‘last resort’. Alongside this, a 
second, enduring impression emerging from the empirical work undertaken on enforcement of 
environmental law relates to the ways in which environmental prosecutions are engaged with 
in the courts. Evidence suggest that once regulatory agencies resort to formal legal responses 
in the form of prosecutions, this often takes place against a background of an in-court 
‘trivialisation’ of the offences.2 Notwithstanding the significant variation in enforcement 
responses and strategies between environmental media and regulatory agencies, together these 
works have informed assumptions that the enforcement of environmental law is often informal, 
unofficial even, and at times treated lightly by the courts. 
 Against this, this article examines the introduction of and the dynamics between two 
separate changes to the enforcement landscape by dissecting the introduction of civil sanctions 
for specific regulatory offences – specifically that of enforcement undertakings introduced by 
the Regulatory Sanctions and Enforcement Act 20083 – and the introduction of sentencing 
guidelines for environmental offences issued in 2014.4 The analysis of these changes is relevant 
beyond the discrete area of environmental law, considering that the regulatory sphere of 
environmental law often serves as a test tube for regulatory innovations which are subsequently 
                                                          
1 K. Hawkins, Environment and Enforcement (1984) and A. Ogus and P. Burrows, Policing Pollution (1982). 
2 P. de Prez, ‘Excuses, Excuses: The Ritual Trivialisation of Environmental Prosecutions’ (2000) 12 JEL 65. 
3 Regulatory Enforcement and Sanctions Act 2008 Part 3 and Environmental Civil Sanctions (England) Order 
2010 SI 1157. 
4 Sentencing Council, Environmental Offences Definitive Guideline (2014). 
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rolled out in other areas of regulation. By focusing on a subset of regulatory enforcement such 
as the enforcement of environmental law, important nuances and details of wider relevance can 
be brought to light.5  
 In order to gain a comprehensive picture of the practical implications of these two new 
regimes, the article relies on empirical and quantitative assessments of the 276 enforcement 
undertakings accepted to date by the Environment Agency (set out in part 2.1) and an 
assessment of a series of cases in which the courts have applied the recent sentencing guidelines 
(in Part 2.2). The article finds that the use of enforcement undertakings has increased rapidly 
in the short time during which they have been available to the Agency. Importantly, the article 
also finds that the rate at which offenders have pro-actively offered an enforcement undertaking 
to the Environment Agency has increased significantly, suggesting that offenders are 
increasingly willing to come forward, following incidents of pollution. The reasons for this are 
several and likely to include the fact that as the statutory framework has embedded over time, 
offenders (and their advisers) are more likely to have familiarised themselves with the new 
statutory framework. An additional driver which justifies the side-by-side analysis of the civil 
sanctions regime and the sentencing guidelines for environmental offences, is that the 
introduction of the sentencing guidelines and their subsequent application by the courts have 
provided a strong incentive for certain offenders to pursue an enforcement undertaking rather 
than running the risk of facing prosecution.  
The main theme to emerge from this analysis is the argument that negotiation continues 
to play a central role in enforcement albeit in a more contractually-based manner through 
enforcement undertakings. This contractualisation of negotiations can arguably be explained 
by two factors. First, as discussed below, there is reason to assume that the use of enforcement 
undertakings have in part displaced the use of criminal prosecutions at least  for certain types 
of environmental offences. Where this is the case, the central role of negotiation in the 
enforcement process has resulted in compliance being sought through a process which is 
strictly speaking less prescribed than that of a prosecution (though it remains formal in the 
sense that a written binding agreement is ultimately agreed). This, in turn, means that the role 
of formal legal responses in the enforcement process cannot any longer reasonably be said to 
be a ‘last resort’. Second, where the increased use of enforcement undertakings takes place as 
an alternative to the type of informal negotiation portrayed by Hawkins, the enforcement is 
increasingly formalised as a result of the binding and written nature of the enforcement 
                                                          
5 R. Macrory Regulation, Enforcement and Governance in Environmental Law 2nd ed (2014).  
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undertaking. Ultimately, however, the extent to which this second factor plays a role is not 
possible to establish simply because changes to the informal practices would not be detectable 
in any available data on the use of formal responses.   
The second main theme which emerges from this analysis in relation to the perceived 
‘trivialisation’ of environmental prosecutions relates to the use of the courts by the Sentencing 
Council’s sentencing guidelines for environmental offences. The article argues that the courts’ 
application of the guidelines points to a willingness of the criminal courts to take seriously 
environmental offences and to signal judicial condemnation of serious environmental harm (at 
least in certain types of cases).  
Before embarking on these points in detail a few points must be noted. First, an 
additional and significant change in the enforcement landscape since the seminal work by 
Hawkins and others is that enforcement has to a great degree been formalised through the 
publishing of specific enforcement policies and strategies. Formalised in the sense that the 
enforcement increasingly takes place against a background of specific provisions of 
administrative accountability and rule of law-like policies. In the case of the Environment 
Agency this formalisation is expressed in its Enforcement and Sanctions Policy which sets out 
the principles, guiding the Agency’s enforcement decisions specifically in the context of 
consistency, accountability and transparency.6 At the time when much of the socio-legal 
research into the enforcement of environmental law was undertaken, such policies simply did 
not exist. The creation of such policies has arguably resulted in a fundamental change to 
enforcement actions as these are now a lot less flexible and open to public scrutiny.7  
Second, from a methodological perspective, the work by Hawkins and others which has 
succeeded in shaping our understanding of regulatory enforcement takes the form of a socio-
legal inquiry into the nature of enforcement of specific pollution offences.8 In seeking to revisit 
these assumptions, this article takes an altogether different approach on two levels. First, 
empirically, this article focuses only on the formal responses adopted by the Environment 
Agency and does not as such engage with the informal yet important measures of enforcement 
which no doubt continue to play a dominant role. Second, this study restricts itself to a purely 
desk-based assessment of the use of enforcement undertakings coupled with an analysis of a 
                                                          
6 Environment Agency, ‘Enforcement and Sanctions Policy’ (2018) at 
<https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/environment-agency-enforcement-and-sanctions-
policy/environment-agency-enforcement-and-sanctions-policy> (accessed October 15 2018). 
7 In Wandsworth LBC v Rashid [2009] EWCA 1844 (Crim), for example, the Environment Agency’s application 
of its own enforcement policy was unsuccessfully challenged by an offender on grounds of abuse of process.  
8 Op. cit., n. 1. 
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series of judicial decisions. To that effect, a freedom of information request was submitted to 
the Environment Agency in order to get access to information on all enforcement undertakings 
agreed by the Agency, resulting in a complete data set of 276 enforcement undertakings. 
Though the Agency makes the most recent list of undertakings available online, lists of 
previous undertakings are removed from the government website (the Agency’s offer form 
states that the Agency may publish information for a period of not less than three months or 
more than 12 months).9 The data on levels of fines used in the article is based on the Sentencing 
Council’s report Assessing the Impact of the Sentencing Council’s Environmental Offences 
Definitive Guideline.10 The cases discussed in part 2.2 were selected from a search on cases 
reported in the ENDS Report from the period of the sentencing guidelines coming into force in 
July 2014 to May 2018.11 The ENDS Report was used instead of more traditional law reports 
(including that of the Environmental Law Reports, Env. L.R.) as most of the cases in which the 
guidelines have been applied are unreported Crown Court cases.  
To be clear, the purpose of the article is not to invalidate nor falsify the assumptions 
and conclusions uncovered by the likes of Hawkins. As noted already, this article revisits the 
basis of deep-held assumptions; it does not seek to refute these in their entirety nor does it seek 
to argue that the seminal work which has helped shape our understanding of environmental law 
is no longer relevant. Instead this article uses an analysis which combines quantitative and 
traditional doctrinal methods to examine the practical effects of changes in the law which in 
turn is used as a basis on which to revisit our understanding of enforcement of environmental 
law.  
   
 
 2.1 ENFORCEMENT UNDERTAKINGS 
The reliance on criminal law as a sanctioning tool has historically been dominant in the 
enforcement of environmental law as a result of the pervasiveness of strict liability offences.12 
                                                          
9 At <https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/enforcement-undertakings-accepted-by-the-environment-
agency> (accessed October 15 2018). 
10 Sentencing Council, Assessing the Impact of the Sentencing Council’s Environmental Offences Definitive 
Guideline (2016) at <https://www.sentencingcouncil.org.uk/wp-content/uploads/Environmental-
assessment.pdf> (accessed October 15 2018). 
11 At <https://www.endsreport.com> (accessed October 15 2018).  
12 Not all environmental offences are strict liability offences. In a subset of offences the actus reus of the offence 
is not the harmful act itself causing pollution but the failure to comply with, for example, remediation and 
enforcement notices. For example the Environmental Protection Act 1990 s 78M and the Town and Country 
Planning Act 1990 s 179. 
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The centrality of criminal sanctions in the enforcement regime has changed with the 
introduction of the Regulatory Enforcement and Sanctions and Act in 2008 and the 
Environmental Civil Sanctions Order of 2010. A central focus of the civil sanctions regime 
was the desire to avoid ‘over-criminalisation’ of regulatory offences which occurs where 
criminal responses are the primary method of enforcement. 13 To this effect, the Regulatory 
Enforcement and Sanctions Act 2008 made a series of civil sanctions available to different 
regulatory agencies (including the Environment Agency) in the form of fixed monetary 
penalties, variable monetary penalties, compliance notices, restoration notices, stop notices and 
enforcement undertakings.14 The Environmental Civil Sanctions (England) Order 2010 applied 
these sanctions to a host of offences across different environmental law regimes.15  
Of most interest for present purposes is the introduction of enforcement undertakings 
(if for no other reason that it is the instrument which the Environment Agency has come to rely 
on the most).16 An enforcement undertaking is a legally binding written agreement between the 
offender and the regulatory agency in which the offender promises to undertake specific steps 
aimed at securing compliance.17 The undertaking can be either proactive or reactive, depending 
on whether it is the offender or the regulatory agency initiating the undertaking. Often 
enforcement undertakings include promises to remedy the harm caused as well as to 
compensate third-parties who might have suffered as a result of the offence. In practice, this 
compensation often takes the form of donation to a conservation or wildlife trust or similar 
charitable causes.18 The use of charitable donations in place of direct compensation to affected 
                                                          
13 R. Macrory, Regulatory Justice: Making Sanctions Effective (2006) at 37. 
14 Regulatory Enforcement and Sanctions Act 2008 op. cit., n. 3. See C. Abbot, Enforcing Pollution Control 
Regulation (2009) for an overview of enforcement undertakings as these are used in other jurisdictions. 
15 Environmental Civil Sanctions (England) Order op. cit., n. 3. The Order applies the portfolio of civil sanctions 
to a series of offences, including, the depositing of controlled waste without a permit under s 33 of the 
Environmental Protection Act 1990; the failure to provide assistance or information or to permit any inspection 
for the purposes of entering premises under s 110(2)(b) of the Environment Act 1995; the pollution of waters 
containing fish under s 32 the Salmon and Freshwater Act 1986; the failure to register as a producer as required 
by regs 4(4)(a) and 40 of the Producer Responsibility Obligations (Packaging Waste) Regulations 2007; and a 
series of offences under ss 1(1) and 13(1) of the Wildlife and Countryside Act 1981 (as amended) including, but 
not limited to, the killing and destroying of wild birds and eggs and the intentional picking and uprooting of wild 
plants. Importantly, the Environmental Permitting (England and Wales) (Amendment) (England) Regulations 
2015 SI 2015 324 extended the use of enforcement undertakings to cover offences under regs 12 and 38 of the 
Environmental Permitting (England and Wales) Regulations 2017. 
16 In the period covered by the study the Environment Agency has issued one fixed monetary penalty, one stop 
notice and one variable monetary penalty.  
17 Environment Agency, ‘Enforcement Undertaking Offer Form’ at 
<https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/460813/784_
14.pdf> (accessed October 15 2018). See also O.W. Pedersen ‘Environmental Enforcement Undertakings and 
Possible Implications: Responsive, Smarter or Rent Seeking?’ 76 Modern Law Review (2013) 319. 
18 Pedersen, id. 
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third-parties is particular prevalent where environmental harm is diffuse and no third-party in 
particular has suffered a specific harm. 
 A central characteristic of the enforcement undertaking is that it offers the regulatory 
agency flexibility on several levels. It affords the regulator flexibility in terms of responding to 
particular offences with a response that is not necessarily grounded in criminal law (with the 
associated reputational damages this may entail for the offender). Enforcement undertakings 
also provide flexibility when it comes to tailoring enforcement actions to unique circumstances 
and specific offenders as opposed to applying a rigid system of criminal sanctions.19 
Importantly, an enforcement undertaking offers regulators ‘an extra tool’ that can be applied 
across a wide spectrum of offences and in a wide range of situations.20 
Against this, the use of enforcement undertakings gives rise to a series of related 
criticisms, concentrating on the need for accountability and oversight.21 Specifically, this 
criticism arises in the context of the extensive use of charitable donations and the lack of 
oversight over choice of charitable course as well as the ways in which the donations are spent 
as the statutory framework does not provide any audit mechanism of the donations. Similarly, 
albeit for good reasons, the actual process of negotiating the undertaking is, unlike criminal 
proceedings before the courts, conducted outside the scope of public scrutiny (though the 
Agency’s Enforcement and Sanctioning Policy includes a right for offenders and victims to 
have enforcement decisions reviewed internally).22 Taken together these criticisms potentially 
give rise to a perception that enforcement undertakings are simply a way for offenders to buy 
their way out of offending. On this reading, the move towards use of enforcement undertakings 
sits neatly within a broader move away from traditional means of enforcement towards an 
agenda of deregulation as this play out across a wide range of sectors beyond that of just 
environmental law (including, for example, health and safety regulation).23 
 Turning to the actual use of enforcement undertakings by the Environment Agency, the 
first point to note is that the Agency has made frequent use of enforcement undertakings since 
their inception.24 In the period covering January 2011 to December 2017, the Environment 
                                                          
19 R. Macrory op. cit., n. 13 et seq. 
20 P. Hampton, Reducing Administrative Burdens – Effective Inspection and Enforcement (2005) at 116. 
21 See K. Yeung, Securing Compliance: A Principled Approach (2004) and Pedersen op. cit., n. 17 for an analysis 
of the public accountability implications of the use of enforcement undertakings. 
22 Environment Agency, ‘Enforcement and Sanctions Policy’ op. cit., n. 6. 
23 Steve Tombs and David Whyte, ‘Transcending the Deregulation Debate? Regulation, Risk, and the 
Enforcement of Health and Safety Law in the UK’ (2013) Regulation and Governance 61. 
24 By comparison, the number of total non-compliance incidents for activities regulated by the Environment 
Agency is not easy to come by. ‘Regulating for People, the Environment and for Growth’ (2017) at 
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Agency accepted 276 enforcement undertakings altogether. For these offences, the vast 
majority of the offenders are companies (96.4%) with only five being individuals (1.8%) in 
addition to one local authority (0.4%) and four partnerships (1.4%). Similarly, the vast majority 
of enforcement undertakings accepted (74.6%) have been accepted for offences under the 
Producer Responsibility Obligations (Packaging Waste) Regulations 2007 (table 1) where the 
offence most commonly consists of the offender (defined by size of turnover or volume of 
production of packaging waste) failing to register with a compliance scheme, aiming to offset 
the environmental impact associated with use of packaging materials. In contrast, hardly any 
prosecutions are carried out against packaging waste offenders. A total of 20.3% of 
undertakings were accepted for more traditional pollution offences under the Salmon & 
Freshwater Fisheries Act 1975 (where the offences typically relate to discharge activities, 
causing harm to watercourses) and the Environmental Permitting Regulations (where the 
offences typically relate to pollution activities not authorised by a permit) (8.3% and 12% 
respectively).  
 In this context, it must be borne in mind that the trend for data on actual non-compliance 
incidents suggest that the number of actual pollution incidents is dropping, though this data is 
not conclusive nor easily accessible. The Environment Agency reports what it calls 
substantiated and closed ‘serious pollution incidents’ which is incidents classified as Category 
1 and 2 incidents under its Common Incident Classification System (CICS).25 The numbers of 
Category 1 and 2 incidents for the period from which data is available are as follows: 2012: 
503 incidents; 2013: 688 incidents; 2014: 614 incidents; 2015: 499 incidents; 2016: 508 
incidents, suggesting some fluctuation though an overall downward trend.26 On the face of it, 
this suggests that the increased use of enforcement undertakings takes place against a 
background of overall fewer pollution incidents. However, verifying this is not possible from 
the available data as drop in serious pollution incidents (Category 1 and 2 incidents) relate to 
the types of offences for which the Agency is unlikely to accept an enforcement undertaking.27  
                                                          
<https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/663672/Reg
ulating_for_people_the_environment_and_growth_2016_summary.pdf> (accessed October 15 2018). 
25 CICS Category 1 is where an incident would have the potential to have a major environmental impact; 
Category 2 is where an incident would have the potential to have a significant environmental impact; Category 3 
is where an incident would have the potential to have a minor environmental impact; and Category 4 is where an 
incident would have no potential to have an environmental impact. 
26 Environment Agency, ‘Regulating for People, the Environment and for Growth’ (2017) at 
<https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/663672/Reg
ulating_for_people_the_environment_and_growth_2016_summary.pdf> (accessed October 15 2018). 
27 Guidance from the Environment Agency suggest that they are unlikely to accept an offer of an undertaking for 
an offence which has caused environmental harm classified as category 1 or category 2 unless the culpability of 
the offender is low at <https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/environment-agency-enforcement-and-
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 One reason for the extensive use of enforcement undertakings is likely that these are 
generally perceived as being a cost-effective tool in securing compliance. Not because the 
actual time spent on the enforcement process is necessarily a great deal lower but because the 
regulatory agency can recover costs arising from the enforcement proceedings (discussed in 
detail below).28 This is important on two levels. First, the significant cuts which the 
Environment Agency has experienced to its operational budget has undoubtedly spurred the 
Agency towards considering more cost-effective methods of regulation and enforcement.29 
Second, by virtue of the Deregulation Act 2015, the Agency is now under a statutory obligation 
to consider the impacts of its regulatory activities (including enforcement) on the nation’s 
economic growth (which came into force in March 2017).30 Though this obligation does not 
apply to individual decisions taken as part of criminal prosecutions, it is likely that it shapes 
the future institutional desire within the Agency for certain methods of enforcement over 
others.31 Moreover, there is arguably scope for the growth duty to exert pressure on the choice 
of enforcement responses in light of the added emphasis in the Deregulation Act 2015 on the 
need to secure that regulatory actions are proportionate.32 This is particularly prominent 
considering that the distinction between the points in time before a decision is taken to 
prosecute and after the formal decision to prosecute has been made is not necessarily clear-cut. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
sanctions-policy/annex-1-res-act-the-environment-agencys-approach-to-applying-civil-sanctions-and-accepting-
enforcement-undertakings#enforcement-undertakings> (accessed 15 October 2018). 
28 Pedersen op. cit., n. 17. 
29 For example Ends Report, ‘Environment Agency Slashes Frontline Enforcement Staff’ (2017) 13 April 
available at <https://www.endsreport.com/article/56054/environment-agency-slashes-frontline-enforcement-
staff> (accessed October 15 2018).  
30 Deregulation Act 2015 s 108. 
31 Environment Agency, ‘Enforcement and Sanctions Policy’ op. cit., n. 6. 
32 Deregulation Act 2015 s 108(2)(b). 
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Table 1 Enforcement undertakings by offence 
Offence/Legislation No/per cent 
of total EU  
Reactive/Proactive 
per cent 
Median 
contribution33   
Producer Responsibility  Obligations 
(Packaging Waste) Regulations 2007 
206/74.6 48/52 £9,150 
Salmon & Freshwater Fisheries Act 
1975 (SAFFA) 
23/8.3 100/0 £250,000 
Env. Permit. Regs 33/12 94/6 £25,200 
WRA 1991 (Abstraction) 6/2.2 100/0 £625 
Control of Pollution (Oil Storage) 
(England)  Regulations  2001 
4/1.4 75/25 £700 
Hazardous Waste Regs. 2005 3/1.1 66.6/33.3 £28,000 
Transfrontier  Shipment of Waste 
Regulations 2007 
1/0.3 100/0 £10,000 
Reactive/Proactive indicates whether the offender or the EA initiates the enforcement undertaking. 
The heavy reliance on enforcement undertakings for offences under the packaging regulations 
is not surprising in light of the intentions behind the introduction of the regime which was to 
resolve problems of over-criminalisation and the inappropriate use of criminal sanctions. Many 
of the offending companies found to be in non-compliance with the packaging regulations’ 
requirement to register with a compliance regime (a strict liability offence) would simply not 
know that they are committing a criminal offence until the Environment Agency informs them. 
Similarly, with the statutory criteria establishing whether or not a company must register or not 
are defined by reference to turnover or volume of production, there is a real chance that an 
offending company which has had a particularly profitable year finds itself subject to the 
requirements from one year to the next without necessarily being aware of this. The use of 
enforcement undertakings in the context of offences under the Salmon & Freshwater Fisheries 
Act 1975 arguably reflects the fact that enforcement undertakings were not initially made 
available for offences under the environmental permitting regime. Only in 2015 were 
undertakings made available to the Agency for permitting offences.34 Prior to that, to the extent 
an act of water pollution would fall under the actus reus of the offence of s. 4 of the Salmon & 
                                                          
33 The study has made use of median size of contributions as opposed to the mean (average) size on account of 
the asymmetrical distribution of charitable contributions. The presence of several outliers at the very high end of 
the scale of charitable contributions would distort the mean. 
34 The Environmental Permitting (England and Wales) (Amendment) (England) Regulations (2015) op. cit., n. 15. 
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Freshwater Fisheries Act 1975 (of discharging matter or effluent that is poisonous or injurious 
to fish, spawn, spawning areas or food of fish), and was committed by an operator who would 
simultaneously operate under an environmental permit, classifying the offence as falling within 
Salmon & Freshwater Fisheries Act 1975 would simply allow the Agency to negotiate an 
undertaking instead of, for example, initiating a prosecution against an offender.  
A defining feature of the enforcement undertakings is that these can be ‘offered’ 
proactively by the offender, suggesting an element of self-regulation on behalf of the 
offender.35 In reality, however, the majority of the undertakings accepted by the Environment 
Agency are reactive, i.e. initiated and negotiated at the behest of the Agency (though 
undertakings agreed under the packaging waste regulations stand out with a reactive/proactive 
split close to 50/50). Of the 276 accepted undertakings, 62.7% were reactive whereas 37.3% 
were proactive, suggesting that most enforcement activities are still a result of Agency initiative 
as opposed to offenders coming forward voluntarily.36 Viewed across the nearly seven-year 
period that the undertakings regime has been available to the Agency, the findings suggest, 
however, that this is gradually changing (Figure 1). As the enforcement regime has matured, 
and no doubt as offenders and their advisers have become familiar with the new regime, the 
rate at which offenders have come forward proactively to offer an undertaking has increased 
significantly to the point that it now approximates a 50/50 rate.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
35 Pedersen op. cit., n. 17. 
36 Whether or not an undertaking is proactive or reactive is recorded in the information made publicly available. 
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Figure 1. Enforcement undertakings reactive/proactive  
Reactive/Proactive indicates whether the offender or the EA initiates the enforcement undertaking. 
The introduction of the sentencing guidelines may be an additional factor in the change of rate 
at which undertakings are offered proactively by offenders. As discussed in detail below, the 
introduction of the sentencing guidelines has had a significant effect on the median size of fines 
handed down by the courts. In light of this, it is very likely that offenders and their legal 
advisers, where they are aware that an offence has been committed, are more willing to come 
forward and offer an undertaking rather than risking the sizeable fine that might follow from a 
criminal conviction.  
 The link between the introduction of the sentencing guidelines and the tendency of 
offenders to offer an enforcement undertaking is strengthened if one considers that the median 
size of financial contribution made by an offender in order to secure equivalent benefit or 
improvement of the environment (often taking the form of a donation to a charitable course) is 
£11,769 across the seven years covered by the study.37 This is significantly lower than the 
median fine handed down by the Crown Court for offences covered by the sentencing 
guidelines of £28,000 (see below). There is thus a real incentive for offenders to offer an 
undertaking in the hope of avoiding a criminal prosecution. Having said that, this variation may 
simply be a reflection of the relevant offences against which enforcement actions are taken: the 
offences which are prosecuted are likely the more serious offences attracting a higher degree 
of condemnation. Similarly, it must be borne in mind that the financial contribution offered by 
an offender as part of an enforcement undertaking is just one part of the overall cost incurred 
                                                          
37 See op. cit., n. 18 and accompanying text.  
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by the offender (depending on the type of offence). As part of the undertaking, the offender 
will typically be required to take actions to stop offending and, as far as possible, to restore the 
environment to the position it was in prior to the offence and put in place internal compliance 
and management procedures.38 Moreover, the offender will be required to cover costs incurred 
by the Environment Agency.39 In this exercise of agency cost-recovery emerges another 
explanation for the extensive use of enforcement undertakings. Through an enforcement 
undertaking, the Environment Agency will be able to recover costs incurred as part of the 
enforcement process, including costs arising from site inspection, for checking compliance, for 
follow-up visits and for costs arising from issuing the completion certificate which will be 
issued once the offender has convinced the Agency that they have been brought back into 
compliance. The Environment Agency is ordinarily not able to recover these costs where it 
decides to prosecute an offender.40 Moreover, a direct comparison between the median 
charitable donation and median fine arguably glosses over the relative distinctive nature of the 
relevant offences for which enforcement action is taken. For example, the majority of the 
pollution offences for which enforcement undertakings have been used to date are incidents of 
water pollution committed by utility companies whereas the offences for which prosecutions 
have taken place likely represent a wider range of environmental harms and types of offenders 
(including waste offences).  
 It must also be borne in mind that the median charitable donation varies significantly 
between types of offences. The median charitable contribution for undertakings agreed under 
the Salmon & Freshwater Fisheries Act 1975 stands at £250,000 (discharging matter or effluent 
that is poisonous or injurious to fish, spawn, spawning areas or food of fish) whereas the median 
contribution for offences under the Producer Responsibility Obligations (Packaging Waste) 
Regulations 2007 is £9150 (typically failure to register with compliance scheme and/or failure 
to take reasonable steps to recover and recycle packaging waste). The significant variation 
reflects the fact that the calculation for donations will vary from offence to offence. For a 
packaging offence, for example, the donation ought to reflect the total costs that an offender 
has avoided through non-compliance as well as a ‘top-up’ between 10-30%, depending on 
                                                          
38 In the many enforcement undertakings accepted for offences under the Producer Responsibility Obligations 
(Packaging Waste) Regulations 2007 there is of course little if any quantifiable environmental harm to compensate 
for. 
39 The Environment Agency thus expect the total costs incurred by the offender to equate to the level of fine that 
might have been handed down had the offender been prosecuted, Environment Agency, ‘Enforcement 
Undertaking Offer Form’ op. cit., n. 17. 
40 Environmental Protection Act 1990 s 59 does, however, provide for so-called restorative enforcement powers, 
allowing, for example, the Environment Agency to take steps to eliminate or reduce the consequences of pollution 
and to recover reasonably incurred costs from the offender. See also s 161A of the Water Resources Act 1991.  
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whether the enforcement undertaking is reactive or proactive. For other offences (and 
especially where an offence has caused harm to water resources), the Environment Agency 
suggests that offenders make use of the Agency’s Natural Capital Assessment Calculator in 
order to calculate the equivalent benefit and thereby donation.41 Moreover, many of the 
offenders entering into enforcement undertakings under the Salmon & Freshwater Fisheries 
Act 1975 are utility companies, i.e. corporate offenders with very large financial turnovers, 
having caused significant environmental harm which will be expensive to remedy. On the other 
hand, offenders agreeing undertakings under the Producer Responsibility Obligations 
(Packaging Waste) Regulations 2007 will be smaller corporate offenders, who have 
unknowingly caused little directly tangible environmental harm. Similarly, the relatively high 
median charitable contribution agreed in undertakings under the Environmental Permitting 
Regulations likely reflects that a subset of offenders are utility companies. Looking ahead, it is 
likely that the median charitable donation agreed under the Environmental Permitting 
Regulations will increase in the years to come as a result of enforcement undertakings being 
increasingly used for permitting offences, including for offences committed for utility 
companies. 
 In addition to the variation in charitable donations between offences, the median size 
of donations have increased over the years.42 In the seven years enforcement undertakings have 
been available to the Environment Agency, the median charitable donation has nearly doubled 
from £8,621 in 2011 to £15,240 in 2017. Again, one likely explanation for this is the 
introduction of the sentencing guidelines in 2014 and the fact that the donation agreed by the 
offender and the Environment Agency is intended to reflect the fine an offender would likely 
have faced were they to be convicted in court. An additional explanation is simply that with 
the increased use and awareness of enforcement undertakings among offenders and legal 
advisers, an increasing group of large corporate offenders (for example offenders that have 
gained significant financial advantage from non-compliance) are entering into enforcement 
undertakings.  
 
 
                                                          
41 Environment Agency Enforcement and Sanctions Policy op. cit., n 6 Annex I.  
42 In making this point it must be borne in mind that undertakings are not made publicly available until they are 
finalised and some undertakings will therefore relate to offences which have occurred in years earlier than the 
year at which the EU is made public. The trend line therefore becomes the main point to consider in making this 
argument.  
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Figure 2 Median charitable donation in £ over time 
 
 
Broken down by type of offence/legislation, the findings suggest that offenders under 
the packaging regulations are more likely to come forward at their own behest at a significantly 
higher rate than offenders committing offences under any of the other regimes (table 1). Those 
coming forward may do so for several reasons relating to knowledge of an actual offence being 
committed and the commercial interests at place in the packaging waste regime. Thus, though 
it is likely that a subset of packaging waste offenders may not know that they are committing 
a criminal offence, those offenders who, for whatever reason, become aware that they are 
committing an offence, are likely to be committing the offence unbeknownst to the 
Environment Agency for whom it is virtually impossible to keep under supervision every 
potential business qualifying under the regime just as packaging offences are likely to escape 
the attention of the public. This lack of Agency supervision and lack of public awareness is 
unlikely to be a factor in cases of serious incidents of water pollution. Added to this is likely 
the commercial interest at play in an area where third-parties such as consultants, experts and 
advisers can gain a commercial advantage by counselling and advising companies about how 
best to secure compliance with the rules which the offender typically have little knowledge 
about. Several for profit environmental compliance companies as well as law firms specifically 
advertise their expertise in calculating avoided costs (for example in context of packaging 
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offences) as well as in negotiating enforcement undertakings on behalf of an offender.43  These 
developments represent a significant change in the dynamics of enforcement of environmental 
law from the practices described in Hawkins’ seminal work where enforcement was primarily 
at the behest of the regulator. At present, the enforcement process increasingly afford the 
regulated entities (and their representatives) greater scope for taking part in and shaping the 
enforcement process proactively.  
 
2.2 CRIMINAL PROSECUTIONS 
Whilst the civil sanctions regime was introduced in part to facilitate flexibility of regulatory 
enforcement, the 2014 sentencing guidelines for environmental offences sought to engage a 
separate yet related problem: that of under-deterrence.44 Under-deterrence occurs where the 
offender perceives the costs of detection and imposition of a potential penalty as being lower 
than the benefit gained from engaging in illegal activities.45 The presence of under-deterrence 
has been particularly prevalent in enforcement of environmental law as a result of the courts 
being perceived as handing down low fines.46 Traditionally and aside from the issue of under-
deterrence, there are three criticism of the perceived leniency. First, it has served to trivialise 
the harm caused to the environment and thereby the social stigma associated with illegal 
activities.47 Second, it provides offenders engaged in unlawful pollution with a competitive 
advantage over to those who comply with the law.48 Third, low fines serve in part to undermine 
the public interest associated with the effort of the Environmental Agency in bringing a 
prosecution (and thereby also costs to the tax payer). 
The sentencing guidelines expressly require the judge to take into account the 
culpability of the offender, the level of environmental harm caused and the offender’s financial 
means when sentencing. Putting forward a step by step map, the guidelines provide the 
                                                          
43 For example Comply Direct at <https://www.complydirect.com/services/packaging-compliance/our-
packaging-compliance-services/civil-sanctions/> (accessed 15 October 2018) and Burges Salmon at 
<https://www.burges-salmon.com/news-and-insight/legal-updates/enforcement-undertakings/> (accessed 
October 15 2018). 
44 M.G. Faure and K. Svatikova, ‘Criminal or Administrative Law to Protect the Environment? Evidence from 
Western Europe’ (2012) 24(2) JEL 253. The Macrory Report op. cit., n 13, specifically recommended the adoption 
of sentencing guidelines.  
45 It is worth noting that the guidelines do not apply to the same set of offences to which enforcement undertakings 
are made available. The sentencing guidelines do not, for example, apply to the offences under ss. 1(1) and 13(1) 
the Wildlife and Countryside Act 1981 nor do they apply to offences prosecuted by for example local authorities.  
46 A. Ogus and Carolyn Abbot, ‘Sanctions for Pollution: Do We Have the Right Regime?’ (2002) 14(3) JEL 283. 
See also Hampton op. cit., n. 20 at 2.71-2.75. 
47 de Prez op. cit., n. 2. 
48 Hampton op. cit., n. 20 at 2.71-2.75. 
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sentencing judge with a starting point (as well as a range) for fines, depending on whether the 
culpability was deliberate, reckless, and negligent or whether there was no culpability against 
the level of environmental harm as defined the Environment Agency’s Common Incident 
Classification System (CICS).49 Having ascertained the level of harm and culpability, the 
sentencing judge is then asked to consider this against the size of the offender’s business by 
reference to it being micro, small, medium or large (the guidelines afford discretion to allow a 
court to move beyond the suggested range for very large organisations).50 As becomes clear, 
the guidelines have sought to introduce a level of structure and thereby also predictability to 
the sentencing process.51 The impact of the guidelines is verifiable on two levels: specific 
doctrinal endorsement of the guidelines by the courts and systematic and quantitative review 
of this application. Several cases suggest that the sentencing guidelines have indeed had a 
demonstrable impact on the level of punishments handed down in environmental offences.52 
From this case law several themes emerge.  
First, though the courts are under an obligation to follow the sentencing guidelines, 
tellingly there are examples of the courts applying the guidelines before they came into effect, 
suggesting that the courts have largely welcomed the guidelines. Thus, the Court of Appeal’s 
judgment in R v Southern Water Services Ltd, 53 handed down before they came into effect, can 
be seen as anticipating the sentencing guidelines, considering that the court expressly singled 
out the defendant’s culpability and financial circumstances as a factor in fining Southern Water 
£200,000 notwithstanding there being no evidence of any actual environmental harm. 
Similarly, in one case before Truro Crown Court in June 2014, the court found support in the 
guidelines, notwithstanding that the guidelines had not yet come into effect, when fining South 
West Water £150,000 for offences under the Environmental Permitting Regulations.54  
                                                          
49 Op. cit., n. 25. See also A. Brosnan, ‘The New Environmental Offences Sentencing Guideline – A Summary 
with Comments’ (2014) 16 ELR 203. 
50 A micro organisation is defined as having a turnover of no more than £2million; a small organisation as having 
a turnover between £2 million and £10 million; a medium organisation as having a turnover between 10 million 
and £50 million; and a large organisation as having a turnover of £50 million and over.  
51 In doing so the guidelines arguably go some way to address some of the criticism levied against the courts for 
facilitating too much uncertainty in the criminal law, relating to environmental harm, E. Lees, Interpreting 
Environmental Offences (2015). 
52 Though there are examples of relatively severe fines being handed down prior to the guidelines coming into 
effect for offences which are not covered by the guidelines. For example R v Day [2014] EWCA Crim 2683, in 
which the defendant was fined £450,000 for offences under the Wildlife and Countryside Act 1981 (to which the 
sentencing guidelines do not apply) with the Court noting that a fine ‘greater than [£450,000] would have been 
amply justified for his grossly negligent conduct in pursuit of commercial gain’ [46]. 
53 [2014] EWCA Crim 120.  
54 R v South West Water, ENDS Report 5 June 2014. See also ‘South West Water Fined £150k for Beach Sewage 
Spill’ (2014) June 11 at <https://www.endsreport.com/article/44307/south-west-water-fined-150k-for-beach-
sewage-spill> (accessed 15 October 2018). 
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Second, the ways in which the courts have applied the guidelines have resulted in a 
series of significant and unprecedented fines being handed down. In August 2014, in one of 
the first cases to make it before the courts under the guidelines, Thames Water was thus fined 
£250,000, following a guilty plea, having unlawfully discharged untreated sewage materials 
into a brook, forming part of a National Trust nature reserve.55 On appeal, the size of the fine 
was upheld by the Court of Appeal.56 The fine levied on Thames Water was, however, soon to 
be exceeded by the £750,000 fine handed down against United Utilities in 2015, following its 
guilty plea to having caused unauthorised sewage discharges into the Duddon Estuary 
designated as a site of special scientific interest (SSSI).57 Not long after this, in January 2016, 
Thames Water was again fined a record £1 million, following the unlawful discharge of sewage 
into parts of the Grand Union Canal in Hertfordshire.58 The record fine of £1 million was, 
however, to last little longer than a year. In March 2017 Thames Water was fined £20 million 
for six offences over a two year period, having discharged an estimated 1.9 billion litres of raw 
sewage into the Thames.59 The large fine represents an example of the Court exercising its 
discretion to move outside the ranges of fines suggested by the sentencing guidelines where an 
organisation’s turnover exceeds the £50 million threshold.  
Third, in handing down record levels of fines, the courts have on several occasions 
expressly stated that not only would it have been appropriate to impose larger fines than the 
ones actually handed down, but also that the size of the fines serve the important purpose of 
deterrence. In R v Thames Water Utilities Ltd the Court of Appeal thus stressed that fines of 
the magnitude handed down were entirely appropriate in order ‘to bring home to the 
management and shareholders the need to protect the environment’ and further that the Court 
‘would have had no hesitation in upholding a very substantially higher fine.’60 Echoing this, 
                                                          
55 R v Thames Water Utilities Ltd, ENDS Report 29 August 2014. See also ‘Thames Water Fined £250k for 
Sewage Spill’ (2014) September 2 at <https://www.endsreport.com/article/45264/thames-water-fined-250k-for-
sewage-spill> (accessed 15 October 2018). 
56 R v Thames Water Utilities Ltd [2015] EWCA Crim 960. 
57 R v United Utilities Ltd, ENDS Report 3 March 2015. See also ‘United Utilities Fined £750k for ‘Reckless 
Failure; in Raw Sewage Incident’ (2015) 5 March at <https://www.endsreport.com/article/47436/united-utilities-
fined-750k-for-reckless-failure-in-raw-sewage-incident> (accessed 15 October 2018). 
58 R v Thames Water Utilities Ltd, ENDS Report 4 January 2016. See also ‘Thames Water Fined Record £1m for 
Sewage Pollution’ (2016) January 5 at <https://www.endsreport.com/article/51119/thames-water-fined-record-
1m-for-sewage-pollution> (accessed 15 October 2018). 
59 R v Thames Water Utilities Ltd, ENDS Report 22 March 2017. See also ‘Thames Water fined Record £20m for 
Repeated Raw Sewage Pollution’ (2017) 22 March available on 
https://www.endsreport.com/article/55353/thames-water-fined-record-20m-for-repeated-raw-sewage-pollution 
(accessed 14 May 2018) and Financial Times, ‘Thames Water Fined Record £20.3m for Sewage Dump’ (2017) 
22 March at <https://www.ft.com/content/0b35cd1a-50c2-353c-bd05-b6b90cfe2a5a> (accessed 15 October 
2018). 
60 R v Thames Water Utilities Ltd [2015] EWCA Crim 960 [35] and [46]. 
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HHJ Bright QC stated, when fining Thames Water £1 million, that ‘the time has now come for 
the courts to make clear that very large organisations […] really must bring about the reforms 
and improvements for which they say they are striving because if they do not the sentences 
passed upon them for environmental offences will be sufficiently severe to have a significant 
impact on their finances.’61 In sentencing Southern Water, the then Lord Chief Justice, 
delivering the Court’s judgment,  perhaps rather optimistically suggested that ‘this will be the 
last case which comes before the court where water companies […] have not taken much more 
seriously the criminality of such offences [and] the seriousness involved’.62 Importantly, the 
courts have shown willingness to censor the presence of environmental risk even where no 
actual environmental harm has been caused. In R v Southern Water Services Ltd, the then Lord 
Chief Justice specifically emphasised the importance of looking ‘to the potential harm’ when 
establishing the level of culpability.63 
A fourth characteristic worth pointing out relates to the character of offenders sentenced 
under the guidelines.  In the majority of cases the defendants are water companies, i.e. utility 
providers with very sizeable turnovers. In ordering the £1 million fine against Thames Water, 
HHJ Sheridan was acutely aware of the negligible impact a £1 million fine might have on 
Thames Water, seeing that the fine represented less than two weeks’ worth of profit.64  
Doctrinal endorsement of the sentencing guidelines aside, the impact of the guidelines 
is further evidenced in quantitative assessment of the level of fines. A study conducted by the 
Sentencing Council over the period from 2005 to 2015 thus suggests that the level of fines 
handed down by the Crown Courts in environmental cases has gone up significantly.65 From 
2011-2013 (prior to the guidelines coming into force) the median fine imposed remained stable 
at approximately £10,000.66 Following the introduction of the guidelines in 2014, the median 
                                                          
61 ENDS Report, ‘Thames Water Fined Record £1m for Sewage Pollution’ (2016) January 5 at 
<https://www.endsreport.com/article/51119/thames-water-fined-record-1m-for-sewage-pollution> (accessed 15 
October 2018). Other sizeable fines include the £480,000 fine handed down to Severn Trent, following a spill of 
raw sewage in South Yorkshire in February and March 2014, ENDS Report, ‘Severn Trent Water Fined £480k 
for Raw Sewage Leaks’ (2015) 28 September at <https://www.endsreport.com/article/49890/severn-trent-water-
fined-480k-for-raw-sewage-leaks> (accessed 15 October 2018) and the £666,000 fine handed down to United 
Utilities in September 2017, following a sewage spill into the River Medlock in Ashton-Under-Lyme, ENDS 
Report, ‘United Utilities fined £666k for Polluting River with Sewage’ (2017) 11 September at 
<https://www.endsreport.com/article/57340/united-utilities-fined-666k-for-polluting-river-with-sewage> 
(accessed 15 October 2018). 
62 [2014] EWCA Crim 120 op. cit., n. 53 [20].  
63 [2014] EWCA Crim 120 op. cit., n. 53 [6] emphasis added. 
64 ENDS Report, Thames Water Fined Record £1m for Sewage Pollution’ (2016) January 5 at 
<https://www.endsreport.com/article/51119/thames-water-fined-record-1m-for-sewage-pollution> (accessed 15 
October 2018). 
65 Sentencing Council op. cit., n. 10. 
66 Id., 5. 
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fine has increased to £28,000 (figure 3).67 The study moreover indicates that the total number 
of organisations sentenced for offences covered by the guidelines has fluctuated significantly 
from a high point of 110 in 2005 to 60 in 2010 before approximately 90 organisations being 
sentenced in 2015.68 The vast majority of organisations sentenced (95% in 2015) receive a fine 
and the vast majority of offences for which sentencing took place in 2015 were for offences 
under regulations 12(1) and 38 of the Environmental Permitting Regulations.69 
 
Figure 3: Median fine amounts imposed on organisations sentenced for offences covered 
by the guidelines, Crown Court, 2005-201670 
 
 
Unlike the increase in fines handed down to offending organisations, the study suggests, 
however, that the levels of fines handed down to individual offenders has fluctuated 
considerably with no discernible pattern.71 Though the overall rate of individuals being 
                                                          
67 Id., 5. In addition to this, the maximum fine handed down by the Crown Courts during the period 2013 to 2015 
were also higher than those in previous years; £200,000 in 2013, £500,000 in 2014 and £250,000 in 2015, 
compared with a maximum fine ranging between £6,000 and £100,000 in the period 2005 to 2012.increased from 
£200,000 in 2013 to £500,000 in 2014. 
68 Id., 4. 
69 Id., 5. 
70 Adopted from Sentencing Council op. cit., n. 10. 
71 Id., 7. 
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sentenced has increased (from 540 individuals in 2005 to 750 individuals in 2015) and fines 
remain the most common sentencing outcome (with an average of 69% of individual offenders 
receiving a fine), there is little evidence to suggest that the guidelines have had any significant 
impact on levels of fines handed down to individual offenders.72 The vast majority of 
convictions of individual offenders were prosecuted in magistrates’ courts (95%) and sentenced 
for offences under s. 33 of the Environmental Protection Act 1990 for unauthorised deposit, 
treatment or disposal of waste. In terms of scale of the illegal operation, this is at the opposite 
end of the spectrum from the utility companies subject to substantial levels of fines (at least as 
far as each individual incident goes though the cumulative environmental impact of waste 
offences is significant).73 This somewhat inconsistent application of the guidelines and 
subsequent lack of structuring effect in a subset of prosecutions is arguably best explained by 
the highly variable nature of the factual and personal circumstances surrounding offences 
committed by individual offenders.  
From this it thus seems that the primary impact of the sentencing guidelines has been 
on the sentencing of organisations and corporate offenders. Having said that, the limitations of 
the study as well as the impact of any extraneous factors must be borne in mind. These primarily 
relate to the potential for bias in the data collected by the Sentencing Council as a result of it 
being supplied by the Environment Agency, which means that it likely includes an over-
representation of the more serious offences and incidents of pollution.74 Similarly, an added 
factor behind the increase in size of fines handed down may be the removal of the cap 
(historically £5,000) on the level of fines magistrates’ courts can hand down. An added 
consideration in the context of individual offenders (in particular in the context of waste 
offences under s. 33 of the Environmental Protection Act 1990) is the increased use of 
confiscation orders under the Proceeds of Crime Act 2002. Up to this point, the primary use of 
confiscation orders has been against serious waste offenders against whom the requirement to 
satisfy the ‘criminal lifestyle’ requirement following a Crown Court conviction has been 
                                                          
72 Environmental Protection Act 1990 s 33 for unauthorised deposit, treatment or disposal of waste. The rate at 
which individual offenders receive custodial sentences remains low at around two per cent, id 7. 
73 ESAET, Waste Crime: Tackling Britain’s Dirty Secret (2014) at 
<http://www.esauk.org/esa_reports/ESAET_Waste_Crime_Tackling_Britains_Dirty_Secret_LIVE.pdf? 
(accessed 15 October 2018).  
74 N. Parpworth, ‘The Impact of the Environmental Offences Sentencing Guidelines: An Early Assessment’ (2017) 
JPL 11-22. 
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comparatively easy to meet compared to water pollution offences which historically have been 
prosecuted in magistrates courts.75  
The analysis of the Environment Agency’s use of enforcement undertakings and the 
application of the sentencing guidelines by the courts holds important lessons for our 
understanding of regulatory and judicial enforcement of environmental law and signal 
significant changes to the dynamics of enforcement. The next section discusses these new 
dynamics and the implications that they have for the ways enforcement of environmental law 
is understood and conceptualised. 
 
3. NEW DYNAMNICS OF ENFORCEMENT  
Modern understandings of the enforcement of environmental law have been significantly 
shaped by some of the seminal socio-legal work undertaken by Hawkins and others, drawing 
out the context of enforcement procedures. In his highly influential work on enforcement of 
pollution controls, Hawkins established that, notwithstanding the high frequency of strict 
liability offences in environmental law, ‘negotiation is the effective way of achieving results.’76 
This emphasis on negotiation has been echoed in the work of Ogus and Burrows who argued 
that negotiation and co-operation form an essential part of the regulators toolkit in order to 
secure compliance.77 As a result of this, formal legal responses are often viewed as a ‘last 
resort’ only yielded when other less formal options have run their cause.78  
The introduction and extensive use of enforcement undertakings have altered this 
picture. Considering the willingness of the Environment Agency to both propose and accept 
enforcement undertakings – a written and legally binding agreement – the analysis suggests 
that formal contractual responses are now very much at the forefront of regulatory 
enforcement.79 This is particularly evident considering the increasing rate at which offenders 
come forward themselves to propose enforcement undertakings (Figure 1). Negotiation 
                                                          
75 Proceeds of Crime Act (2002) s 75. Similarly in waste offences, establishing the economic gains of the offender 
are comparatively easier than in other pollution cases as it includes for example gains from having avoided landfill 
tax. 
76 Hawkins op. cit., n. 1 p. 198. 
77 Ogus and Burrows op. cit., n. 1, p. 124. 
78 Hawkins op. cit., n. 1 ch 10. 
79 A related driving force in this is likely the Written Ministerial Statement issued in 2012 by the then Minister of 
State for Business and Enterprise, restricting the use of other civil sanctions (for example fixed monetary penalties, 
variable monetary penalties and restoration notices) to businesses with more than 250 employees. Daily Hansard 
- Written Ministerial Statements 8 Nov 2012: Column 43WS. 
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consequently remains important but the findings here suggest that the negotiation is conducted 
not informally in the field but through the medium of a written agreement. Though one of the 
intentions behind the introduction of the civil sanctions regime was to provide regulatory 
agencies with a string of less formal sanctioning options, the actual manner in which 
enforcement undertakings are negotiated indicate that they are all but informal. The formal 
character of an enforcement undertaking is exemplified when considering that an undertaking 
is an admission of guilt in all but name. On the Environment Agency’s offer form offenders 
are required to set out in detail what offences have been committed and describe the steps taken 
by the offender to secure compliance (by reference to set dates and criteria) and to rectify any 
environmental harm. Where an undertaking is subsequently not complied with, an offender 
may be subject to criminal proceedings or alternative enforcement proceedings for the original 
offences to which the offender will have alerted the Agency and supplied it with culpable 
information. Moreover, the undertaking remains in force until the point at which the 
Environment Agency issues a completion certificate which only takes place where the offender 
is able to evidence compliance. Added to this process of formalisation of enforcement is the 
argument that, as the use of enforcement undertakings increase, the proposing and negotiating 
of enforcement undertakings is often conducted by legal representatives, acting on behalf of 
the offender. Third parties consequently play an increasingly important role in negotiating 
enforcement responses.  
Against this it must of course be borne in mind that when the likes of Hawkins and 
others highlighted that formal legal response were only used as a last resort, they were referring 
to prosecutions which were the primary enforcement tool at hand for the regulatory agencies.80 
There is little to suggest that the Environment Agency is moving towards prosecuting corporate 
offenders at a higher frequency. In fact, the rate of prosecutions of corporate offenders has 
dropped significantly in recent years and shows a trend of continuing to drop.81 This in itself 
suggests that, except for in the most serious of pollution incidents (or where the offender is a 
repeat offender), prosecutions continue to be relied upon as a last resort. The point made here 
                                                          
80 It must also be borne in mind that Hawkins’s work suggested that enforcement officers were often reluctant to 
initiate enforcement proceedings against offenders unless a degree of negligence or culpability was detected op. 
cit., n. 1. In establishing this, Hawkins’s findings arguably align with the approach taken in the sentencing 
guidelines’ emphasises on the offender’s culpability as a relevant factor. 
81 Environment Agency, ‘Pollution Evidence 2015 Summary’ (2016) at 
<https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/651707/Poll
ution_incidents_2015_evidence_summary_LIT_10487.pdf> (accessed 15 October 2018 and Environment 
Agency, ‘Regulation for People. the Environment and Growth’ (2017) at 
<https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/663672/Reg
ulating_for_people_the_environment_and_growth_2016_summary.pdf> (accessed 15 October 2018). 
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is instead, that the introduction of the civil sanctions regime, and most notably enforcement 
undertakings, have resulted in an increased use of undertakings and that this change – because 
of the contractual nature of an undertaking – suggests that enforcement is increasingly 
conducted through contractual negotiation. Where the use of undertakings takes place at the 
expense of criminal prosecutions, the move towards negotiated contractualism is all the more 
pronounced. Conversely, where the use of undertakings potentially takes place place at the 
expense of informal in-the-field negotiation, the enforcement has potentially moved towards a 
more formal style of negotiation (though a quantitative study of this kind cannot verify this).  
Importantly, the argument that the dynamics of enforcement has moved towards a more 
contractual environment is not to suggest that there is no scope or room for cooperation focused 
on securing compliance. Though the process for negotiating enforcement undertakings remains 
formal, a main focus of the undertaking is still to secure compliance within the offending 
organisation. Often this is done through the offending organisation offering to put in place 
internal compliance programmes. Indeed the aim of securing compliance naturally remains a 
central objective of the Environment Agency’s Enforcement and Sanctions Policy.82 The point 
is instead that the means through which this compliance is secured has potentially shifted from 
the informal ‘in the field’, face to face negotiation described by Hawkins to a contractual 
written process in which the offender increasingly takes the initiative by coming forward by its 
own doing (aided by advisors and legal representatives), offering a written undertaking to the 
Environment Agency.  
 The second significant way in which the dynamics of enforcement of environmental 
law have changed is in the approach taken to criminal responses to environmental offences. 
The analysis provided here suggests that the civil sanctions have contributed to if not 
accelerated a general move away from the use of criminal sanctions in enforcement against 
corporate offenders (but not necessarily for individuals committing waste offences) unless the 
environmental harm caused by the offender is significant. Where the harm caused is significant, 
however, the analysis provided here additionally shows that the courts do not necessarily take 
a lenient approach to environmental offences. Again important socio-legal work has played a 
central role in shaping impressions about judicial attitudes to environmental crimes. As noted 
above, analysis of in-court dynamics in environmental law prosecutions suggest that 
environmental offences have often been met with perplexity and a tendency to trivialise the 
                                                          
82 Environment Agency, ‘Enforcement and Sanctions Policy’ op. cit., n. 6. 
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actions of offenders.83 As a result, a common assumption has been that the fines handed down 
by the courts in environmental prosecutions are too low.84 The introduction of the sentencing 
guidelines and the subsequent application of these by the courts, however, call into question 
these assumptions. As evidenced above, in response to the sentencing guidelines the courts 
have responded by significantly increasing the level of fines handed down in criminal 
environmental prosecutions both in terms of median level of fines as well as absolute record-
level fines. And often decisions suggest that the courts are increasingly willing to recognise the 
seriousness of offences causing significant environmental harm – at least at the level of the 
Crown Courts and the Court of Appeal. 
The point is not so much that the sentencing guidelines have unilaterally transformed 
the ways in which the courts engage with environmental offences. The move away from 
‘trivialising’ environmental offences is likely to form part of a wider cultural trend which has 
been building over a period of time. As evidenced above, the median level of fines has 
increased gradually over the years, including in the years prior to the guidelines being 
introduced.85 Similarly, the new dynamics of enforcement of environmental law do not 
necessarily mean that ‘trivialisation’ no longer plays any role in environmental law 
prosecutions or that low fines are not handed down by the courts. Evidence suggests that 
defendants are still seeking to persuade the courts that the incident classification submitted by 
the Environment Agency (and thereby the gravity of the offence caused) should be revised 
downwards in order to place the defendant in a less severe range of fine akin to the attempts 
by offenders to excuse themselves by reference to bad luck and misfortune of a given set of 
circumstances highlighted by de Prez.86 Similarly, defendants are likely to continue to 
challenge the degree of culpability asserted by the Environment Agency with the view to 
downgrade the category of offence.87 Moreover, the increase in median levels of fines 
discussed above relate exclusively to trials in the Crown Courts and it is not therefore possible 
to establish whether a similar trend plays out in the Magistrates’ Courts. Indeed the majority 
of cases observed in de Prez’s seminal work on the trivialisation of environmental prosecutions 
                                                          
83 For example Sentencing Council op. cit., n. 4 and de Prez op. cit. n. 2.  
84 C. DuPont and P. Zakkow Trends in Environmental Sentencing in England and Wales (2003), Hampton op. 
cit., n. 20, J. Adshead, ‘Doing Justice to the Environment’ (2013) 77 JCL 215 and M. Watson, ‘Environmental 
Offences: The Reality of Environmental Crime’ (2005) ELR 190.  
85 One additional driver behind this might be the Sentencing Advisory Panel’s advice to the Court of Appeal on 
environmental sentencing from 2000. 
86 For example R v Thames Water Utilities Ltd [2015] EWCA Crim 960 [18]. See also ENDS Report, ‘South West 
Water Fined £150k for Beach Sewage Spill’ (2014) June 11 at <https://www.endsreport.com/article/44307/south-
west-water-fined-150k-for-beach-sewage-spill> (accessed 15 October 2018).  
87 For example R v Ineos Chlorvinyls Ltd [2016] EWCA Crim 607. 
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took place in Magistrates’ Courts. The point made here is, however, that the wider assumptions 
generated in part by the work of de Prez and others have left a lasting impression that the 
criminal courts in general have failed to take seriously the importance of environmental 
offences.88 A lasting impression which is, at least in part, no longer tenable. At least not when 
it comes to the sentencing of large corporate offenders as it must also be borne in mind that 
doctrinal evidence discussed above relates primarily to the prosecutions against large water 
companies.89 
In addition to a change in dynamics taking place as a result of reforms to regulatory and 
judicial enforcement, a third dynamic emerging from the analysis above is the interaction likely 
taking place between the civil sanctions regime and the sentencing guidelines. As intimated 
above, there is reason to assume that the increase in the rate of proactive enforcement 
undertakings being offered by offenders is linked to the introduction of the sentencing 
guidelines and the increase in fines following from this. In light of the significant court-
imposed fines now faced by large corporate offenders, causing significant environmental harm, 
there is a significant incentive for them to come forward and offer an enforcement undertaking 
in the attempt to avoid criminal prosecution and the stigma which goes with this. This incentive 
is arguably all the more acute when considering that the use of other types of civil sanctions 
(such as fixed monetary penalties, variable monetary penalties and restoration notices) have 
been restricted to bigger businesses with more than 250 employees, resulting in offenders in 
reality facing the choice between agreeing an enforcement undertaking or facing a criminal 
prosecution.90 Moreover, with enforcement undertakings having been made available for 
certain environmental permitting offences this incentive structure becomes all the more 
relevant for the water companies in particular. Similarly, enforcement undertakings create 
strong incentives for the Environment Agency to enter into an undertaking in light of the 
Agency’s ability to recover a wider range of costs which it would not be able to recover through 
criminal prosecutions. An important emerging dynamic is thus the interaction and incentive 
structure developing between the different regimes of regulatory and criminal enforcement.  
 
                                                          
88 de Prez op. cit. n. 2. 
89 In recent years, British utility companies have been seen as attractive objects of investment as they have reliably 
delivered high returns and shareholder dividends. For example Financial Times, ‘Thames Water: the Murky 
Structure of a Utility Company’ (2017) 4 May. For a critical appraisal of this see J. Meek, Private Island: Why 
Britain now Belongs to Someone Else (2014) ch. 3.  
90 Written Ministerial Statement op. cit. n. 90. 
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4. CONCLUSION 
The enforcement of environmental law is changing. Traditionally enforcement of 
environmental law has taken place in an environment where informal cooperation between 
offenders and regulators has aimed to secure compliance without having to rely on legal 
responses. Increasingly, however, enforcement has become more formalised as a result of the 
enactment of specific enforcement policies and sanctioning statements, ensuring a higher 
degree of consistency in the application of enforcement responses. This does not mean, on the 
other hand, that there is no scope for negotiation of specific enforcement measures between 
regulatory agencies and offenders. Conversely, as a result of the introduction of a new civil 
sanctions regime, coupled with the issuing of sentencing guidelines aimed specifically at 
environmental offences, the enforcement of environmental law is increasingly conducted 
through the negotiation of written agreements – and takes place against a background which 
creates specific incentives for offenders to come forward by their own doing (which they are 
at increasing rates) as well as specific incentives for the regulatory agencies (when it comes to 
their abilities to recover enforcement costs). Similarly, the approach taken to environmental 
offences by the courts is changing as the evidence indicates that the courts are now willing to 
hand down significant fines against corporate offenders. Taken together, these changes call 
into question deep-held assumptions about the reluctance of regulatory agencies to respond to 
violations of environmental law with formal responses and the leniency with which the courts 
approach environmental offences.  
 This attempt to call into question ingrained assumptions does not, of course, mean that 
scholars of regulatory enforcement and environmental law need altogether change their 
understanding of how enforcement works. The study presented in this article has, if anything, 
raised as many questions as it has answered. Fruitful avenues for future investigations include 
the potentially unique dynamics emerging in the devolved administrations where, for example, 
civil sanctions are available for a different and/or limited range of offences and the ways in 
which enforcement undertakings have been applied by the Scottish Environment Protection 
Agency and Natural Resources Wales. Similarly, the public’s attitude towards the use of 
enforcement undertakings – whether they are indeed seen as an instrument for offenders to buy 
their way out of trouble – would significantly improve our understanding of the modern 
regulatory framework for enforcement as would research into the question of why the levels of 
fines handed down to individual offenders continue to fluctuate and differentiate from the fines 
levied against corporate offenders. As highlighted in the seminal work by Hawkins and others, 
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and perhaps to a more modest degree by this study, real value is derived from approaching 
these questions from an empirical starting point.     
